Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05USNATO3,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#05USNATO3**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
05USNATO3	2005-01-05 16:59	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Mission USNATO

Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4028319.ece

```
ACTION EUR-00

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DOEE-00  PERC-00
      EB-00    VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00
      VCE-00   AC-00    NRC-00   NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OES-00   OIC-00
      NIMA-00  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     FMPC-00
      SP-00    IRM-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     SSD-00   PMB-00
      DRL-00   G-00     SSR-00   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /001W
                  ------------------9F5B3E  051720Z /38
R 051659Z JAN 05
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7915
INFO NSC WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
OSD WASHDC

05.01.2005: NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE
THREAT ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T USNATO 000003
STATE FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, NP/PPC, AC/DS
OSD/ISP FOR SCHLESS, ROSE
OSD/MDA FOR KIEFER, SEARSE
NSC FOR VOLKER, DICASAGRANDE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014
TAGS: NATO KNNP PARM MNUC
REF: C-M(2004)109

Classified By: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
```

¶1. (S) Summary: During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile Risks and Threats. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations, the Analysis fulfills in part a 2002 Prague Summit tasking to examine options for addressing ballistic missile threats to the Alliance. At 180 pages, it provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and ballistic missile (BM) proliferation trends the Alliance has ever produced. Among the documents key findings are that some countries currently have the capability to launch a ballistic missile attack on NATOs southeastern flank and U.S. forces in the Pacific, and that the risk of a ballistic missile attack on any Alliance territory, population centers or NATO forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade to come. The Analysis contains unprecedented consensus positions on the intentions, capabilities and proliferation record of Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as Russia and China. It also addresses the contributions of non-proliferation instruments, including new approaches such as PSI and UNSCR 1540, as well as the implications of the A.Q. Khan network.

¶2. (C) Combined with two major feasibility studies and ongoing technical consultations, the Analysis provides NATO with the political consensus and general assessment necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against the full range of ballistic missile threats. In this context, USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong support for the Analysiss development, will continue to request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to brief Allies in the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. End Summary.

Context of the Longer-Term Analysis

¶3. (U) While NATO has yet to make a definitive decision on missile defense for populations and territories, NATOs Strategic Concept notes that NATOs posture against the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery "must continue to improve, including through work on missile defense." At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed "to examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to NATO territory, forces and population centers in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along with deterrence" as well as to initiate a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Feasibility Study.

¶4. (C) This TMD feasibility study, which focuses on the technical requirements, costs, and time scale of possible architectures for an Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system to protect NATO deployed forces, was completed in 2003. In January 2004, a second Missile Defense Feasibility Study was contracted to examine options for protecting Alliance territory and population centers. Upon its scheduled completion in July 2005, this study will be submitted to the Conference of National Armaments Directors, which will review and approve a consolidated report in late ¶2005. This report in turn will be forwarded to the Executive Working Group (Reinforced) (EWG(R)), NATOs primary forum for missile defense consultations.

¶5. (C) During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile Risks and Threats (reftel), which fulfilled another 2002 Prague Summit tasking to assess current and potential WMD and ballistic missile threats to the Alliance over the next ten years. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations, this 180-page Analysis contains unprecedented consensus positions on key countries of proliferation concern and provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and BM

risks and threats the Alliance has ever produced.

¶6. (S) The Analysis is divided into five chapters, which address non-proliferation regimes and national measures; capabilities and intentions; alternative means of delivery; secondary proliferation and procurement networks; and intelligence gaps. As a whole, it clearly demonstrates that NATO already faces certain risks and potential threats, and that the Alliance must continue to closely monitor the intentions and capabilities of countries of proliferation concern.

¶7. (C) Combined with the EWG(R)s ongoing work and the two Missile Defense Feasibility Studies, the Analysis provides NATO with the political consensus and general assessment necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against ballistic missile threats. This includes the goal of achieving initial operational capability for an ALTBMD system to protect NATO deployed forces by 2010 as well as possible steps toward acquiring capabilities to protect Alliance territory and population centers against the full range of BM threats.

Key Findings of the Longer-Term Analysis

¶8. (S) The risk of a ballistic missile attack on any Alliance territory, population centers, or NATO deployed forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade to come. Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can reach parts of NATO territory and deployed forces, and they have chemical weapons (CW) for use as warheads. Concerns over Russian and Chinese BM capabilities are currently primarily limited to the potential for accidental or unauthorized launches, and the risk that their technology will proliferate to unstable countries.

¶9. (S) Current and future assessments of BM capabilities must take into account scenarios where components indigenously developed or acquired from abroad are integrated into existing missile programs to improve accuracy and operational readiness. Countries developing BMs may not necessarily follow U.S. or Russian patterns of development or deployment. North Korea began fielding and selling the No Dong after a single flight test, and countries today may rely in part on computer modeling or other means aside from easily observable test launches to keep their development programs covert.

¶10. (S) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are not widely recognized as an immediate threat to the Alliance, but an indirect risk to NATO deployed forces is possible. In the future, there will be an increased risk that UAVs could be converted to carry and dispense CW and biological weapons (BW). The willingness of some states and illegal entities to transfer UAV or cruise missile (CM) components, peripheral equipment or technology is increasing and requires effective counter-proliferation measures to reduce their availability. There is currently no disarmament or non-proliferation agreement that restrains the production, development or possession of UAVs and CMs.

¶11. (S) Possession of WMD and their means of delivery has become a major goal for both state and non-state actors for reasons of prestige, influence or deterrence. Proliferating states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated measures to obtain WMD- or BM-related equipment, materials and technologies. Some countries that were proliferation customers in the 1980s have themselves become suppliers. The development of indigenous capabilities in relevant dual-use applications such as nuclear power, biotechnology and space launch systems can help to conceal ultimate intentions. North Korea and Iran as well as Russian and Chinese entities are likely to remain the major suppliers of WMD- and BM-related equipment, materials and expertise. The identification, monitoring, and eventual dismantlement of the A.Q. Khan network show that there is a complicated worldwide

marketplace for these inputs.

¶12. (C) Although arms control agreements and non-proliferation regimes will continue to slow the proliferation of WMD and BMs, the capability of both suppliers and proliferants are likely to improve. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is the strongest affirmation of the international communitys support for multilateral treaties and other international instruments that seek to prevent WMD proliferation. Traditional diplomatic measures are enhanced by new tools such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and Operation Active Endeavour, which serve to complement and strengthen international norms and mechanisms.

Select Country-Specific Conclusions

North Korea:
¶13. (S) Recent developments in North Korea seem to indicate ambitions to use WMD combined with BMs not only as a deterrent but also as a political bargaining chip and a means of blackmail to obtain economic or financial aid. Various sources place North Korea has having 10 to 30 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, and while North Korea claims to have a nuclear deterrent, there is uncertainty as to whether it currently has operational nuclear weapons for military use. It is possible that North Korea would use WMD and BMs if it felt that the survival of the regime was at stake.

¶14. (S) Pyongyang is reportedly developing a new land-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched BM; if confirmed, this potential to use a more advanced propulsion technology would be of serious concern. North Korea has continued with development work and ground-based testing of the Taepo Dong-2, which according to some Allies experts with a third stage could deliver a weapons payload of 500 kg up to 15,000 km--i.e., all of the United States and Europe, albeit with very poor accuracy. U.S. forces in the Pacific are within range of North Korean missiles, and it is cause for serious concern that North Koreas willingness to proliferate longer-range BM technology will hasten the risk to broad expanses of NATO territory.

Iran:
¶15. (S) Iran continues to put a high priority on an ambitious BM program focused on the development of both liquid and solid propellant short-range BMs and medium-range BMs with assistance from Russia, North Korea and China. Tehran has announced its intention to put satellites into orbit, which would establish the technical base to develop an IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Iran already has BM capabilities that put the southeastern flank of NATO within range, and within the next ten years, it is likely to produce qualitative and quantitative changes to its military capabilities that will significantly increase the potential threat to the Alliance and NATO forces deployed in the region.

¶16. (S) Concerns have been widely expressed over Irans nuclear program and its failures and breaches regarding its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA cannot positively identify that Irans nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. Should its nuclear program continue to proceed at the same pace, Iran could produce sufficient fissile material for a first nuclear device by 2010. Iran is assessed to have an offensive BW program and has almost certainly conducted BW-related research using spray devices and adapted munitions for delivery. Despite its ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran is also assessed to be retaining an offensive CW program and has the technological capability to develop a CW warhead for use on BMs.

Syria:
¶17. (S) There is no evidence that Syria plans to attempt to acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability, and it

currently lacks the resources, infrastructure and scientific expertise to pursue one. Syria is judged to have a BW program in the research and development phase, as well as an advanced CW program that includes several facilities for testing, production and storage of CW. Syria can produce SCUD missile fuel and various solid propellant ingredients, and continues to make progress in this area with probable Chinese and Iranian assistance. It can deliver both sarin and VX with aerial bombs, SCUD-Bs and possibly SCUD-Cs. Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Syrias WMD and BM capabilities over the next ten years will increase the potential threat to NATO territory, notably the southeastern flank of the Alliance.

China:
¶18. (S) China has a mature capability to develop and launch BMs with nuclear warheads and is carrying out a strategic modernization program to improve the quality of its arsenal, including replacing liquid-fueled ICBMs with solid-fuel systems and deploying more of its BMs on road-mobile launchers. China is believed to have an advanced CW program as well as an offensive BW capability, and its voluntary declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete. While China has the capability to pose a potential threat to NATO territory or deployed forces, at present Beijing focuses on a strategic posture that defends its regional influence in Asia. The greatest concern regarding Chinese capabilities is the risk of onward proliferation of technology and material to other countries. In light of all these elements, NATO must remain aware of developments in China.

Russia:
¶19. (S) While Moscow has no intention of executing military operations against the Alliance, Russia has a mature arsenal of BMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of NATO territory. It is also modernizing its BMs at a measured pace and is pursuing warhead refurbishment. While the Cooperative Threat Reduction program will continue to improve the security of non-deployed nuclear warheads, weapons-grade fissile material will likely remain vulnerable to theft. Russias BW program, which is probably still offensive, remains active and declarations to date have failed to reveal the full size and scope of the Soviet program. Russia possesses a number of unacknowledged CW agents and weapons, and it cannot be entirely excluded that Russia could pursue some non-compliant activity without detection. It has given priority to the development of modern CW systems and agents designed to defeat NATO protective systems and circumvent the CWC. In light of its WMD and BM capabilities, NATO must remain concerned about the potential threat from Russia.

Small Step for NATO MD, Giant Leap for SGP

¶20. (S) Comment: While the Longer-Term Analysis is but one of many inputs into the equation that will determine how NATO will face the spread of WMD and BM capabilities, it has also succeeded in highlighting proliferation issues of key importance to the U.S. Spirited and sometimes contentious debate with Allies (especially France and Germany) over Iran, North Korea, and China in the SGP has in the end produced a broad and agreed foundation for continued engagement with Allies on tough proliferation questions. In this context, USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong support for the Analysiss development, will continue to request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to brief Allies in the SGP and the NAC on WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. While such briefings--and the debates they provoke--may seem to parallel discussion in other fora, it is essential that we raise these issues at NATO Headquarters if the U.S. is to play a leadership role in shaping Alliance policy, guiding the development of collective capabilities, and considering operational responses to curb and counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. End Comment.
BURNS